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LITZ v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT: 
MARYLAND’S DECISION THAT INACTION CAN SUPPORT AN 
INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM 
KERRI MORRISON 
In Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment,1 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland recognized a new basis for inverse condemnation 
claims.2  The case arose following the contamination of the petitioner’s 
lake, allegedly due to the failure of local septic systems.3  The Court of Ap-
peals held that a governmental entity’s inaction, when that governmental 
entity had an affirmative duty to act, can serve as a basis for an inverse con-
demnation claim.4  This holding is somewhat controversial because only a 
few states have recognized that inaction can form the basis of an inverse 
condemnation claim.5  In contrast, some states have expressly held that an 
inverse condemnation claim requires government action.6  The holding of 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, is justified as it: (1) conforms 
with the reasoning used by some courts in other jurisdictions; (2) supports 
the policy objectives underlying takings jurisprudence; and (3) can be lim-
ited in the future to avoid potentially harmful consequences, such as in-
creasing litigation against government entities or increasing government li-
ability for failures to act.7 
                                                          
© 2017 Kerri Morrison. 
 J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The au-
thor thanks her editors, Joshua Carback, Hannah Cole-Chu, Michael Collins, Samriti Madan, and 
Dave Maher, and Professor Michael Pappas for their assistance and their thoughtful comments 
during the writing process.  
 1.  446 Md. 254, 131 A.3d 923 (2016) [hereinafter “Litz II”]. 
 2.  Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931. 
 3.  Id. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 4.  Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931. 
 5.  See infra Part II.B (discussing cases holding that inaction can serve as the basis for in-
verse condemnation claims). 
 6.  See infra Part II.B (discussing cases holding inaction cannot serve as the sole basis for 
inverse condemnation claims). 
 7.  See infra Part IV (analyzing the how the court’s decision conforms with decisions made 
in other jurisdictions and with takings jurisprudence broadly and discussing how the court may 
limit the holding in the future). 
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I.  THE CASE 
The Litz case arose out of the contamination of a privately owned lake 
due to the lack of an adequate sewage system in a Maryland town.8  The pe-
titioner alleged that because of the contamination, she could no longer oper-
ate her property as a campground.9  Following the foreclosure of her prop-
erty, she sued the town of Goldsboro, the state of Maryland, and several 
state agencies alleging, among other claims, an inverse condemnation of the 
property.10  The court analyzed whether government inaction can serve as 
the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.11 
A.  The Contamination of Lake Bonnie 
The property at issue in Litz was a 140-acre property that was pur-
chased by the parents of petitioner Gail Litz in 1948 and located in 
Goldsboro, a small town in Caroline County, Maryland.12  The Litzes trans-
formed a portion of the property into a lake, Lake Bonnie, in the 1950s for 
irrigation purposes and started running a recreational business on the prop-
erty, including activities such as boating, camping, fishing, and swim-
ming.13  In 2001, petitioner Gail Litz inherited this property and became the 
owner of the recreational business.14 
The contamination of Lake Bonnie was caused by two streams that fed 
into the lake.15  Those streams received water from groundwater sources, 
from surface water sources, and from three drainage collection systems.16  
The residents of Goldsboro relied on wells and septic systems because the 
town did not have public water or sewer systems.17  From as early as the 
1970s, however, those septic systems began to fail and contaminated the 
drainage collection system.18  Contamination of the drainage collection sys-
tem in turn contaminated the streams that the drainage system discharged 
into and, ultimately, contaminated Lake Bonnie.19  In 1985, the Caroline 
County Health Department studied the issue and concluded that between 
                                                          
 8.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 9.  Id. at 257–58, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 257, 267, 131 A.3d at 925, 931. 
 12.  Id. at 258, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 259, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 16.  Id., 131 A.3d at 926. 
 17.  Id., 131 A.3d at 925–26. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id., 131 A.3d at 926. 
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seventy and eighty percent of the town had sewage pits, raw sewage, waste 
water, or wells less than one hundred feet from a source of contamination.20 
The failure of the drainage system and the resulting contamination of 
Lake Bonnie continued unabated, despite the County’s findings.21  In 1995, 
the Caroline County Health Department stated that “use of the stormwater 
management system in the Town as a sewage system has gotten to crisis 
proportions,” and the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) 
concluded that the situation impacted Lake Bonnie’s water quality.22  On 
August 8, 1996, MDE and Goldsboro’s mayor at the time, William Bartin, 
signed an administrative consent order.23  The order required Goldsboro to 
identify sources of contamination, complete a study on the construction of a 
sewage system, and submit plans for construction of a sewage system to 
MDE.24  Goldsboro did not fulfill the requirements of the consent order, but 
MDE also failed to penalize the town as the order required.25  Shortly be-
fore the consent order was executed, in June 1996, Litz received a letter 
from the Caroline County Health Department stating that Lake Bonnie 
posed a threat to health because the lake continued to receive water contam-
inated with raw sewage.26  Litz claimed that as a result of her inability to 
operate her recreational business because of the lake’s polluted state, she 
could not afford to make her mortgage payments on the property.27  The 
property was foreclosed and sold to Provident State Bank for $364,000 on 
May 14, 2010.28 
B.  The Procedural History of Litz v. Maryland Department of the 
Environment 
Litz came before the Court of Appeals of Maryland once before, and 
not surprisingly, the case had a somewhat lengthy procedural history.29  On 
March 8, 2010, Litz filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Caroline 
County, alleging negligence and inverse condemnation against Goldsboro, 
the Caroline County Health Department,30 and MDE.31  She also claimed 
                                                          
 20.  Id. at 259–60, 131 A.3d at 926. 
 21.  See generally id. at 259–61, 131 A.3d at 926–27 (describing the history of the Goldsboro 
stormwater drainage and sewage problem and the resulting contamination of Lake Bonnie). 
 22.  Id. at 260, 131 A.3d at 926. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 260–61, 131 A.3d at 927. 
 26.  Id. at 270, 131 A.3d at 932. 
 27.  Id. at 261, 131 A.3d at 927. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 30.  The Caroline County Health Department was treated as a state agency for purposes of the 
litigation.  Id. at 261 n.6, 263 n.9; 131 A.3d at 927 n.6, 928 n.9. 
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trespass and private and public nuisance against Goldsboro and Caroline 
County, and sought a permanent injunction.32  Later, Litz amended the 
complaint to add a count for mandamus or equitable relief under the Envi-
ronmental Standing Act.33  She also added the Maryland Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”) and the state of Maryland as de-
fendants, claiming negligence, trespass, private and public nuisance, and 
inverse condemnation against them, as well as seeking a permanent injunc-
tion against them.34  Litz alleged that because of the contamination, she 
could no longer operate her recreational business and the property was 
“substantially devalued,” resulting in a loss of income that led to her failure 
to make mortgage payments on the property,35 which ultimately led the 
bank to foreclose on the property.36 
Litz’s claims were unsuccessful at the Circuit Court and at the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals.37  Maryland, MDE, DHMH, Caroline Coun-
ty, and Goldsboro filed motions to dismiss, and after a hearing the Circuit 
Court granted those motions.38  Litz subsequently filed a Motion for Recon-
sideration and a Third Amended Complaint, which only added factual alle-
gations.39  The Circuit Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and 
dismissed all the claims with prejudice and without leave to amend.40  Litz 
appealed the decision and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland af-
firmed, concluding Litz’s claims were untimely under the relevant statutes 
of limitations.41  Litz appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which 
affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision dismissing the nuisance claims, but 
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the trespass and negligence claims.42 
                                                          
 31.  Id. at 257, 261, 131 A.3d at 925, 927. 
 32.  Id. at 261, 131 A.3d at 927. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 257, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 37.  Id. at 261–62, 131 A.3d at 927–28. 
 38.  Id., 131 A.3d at 927. 
 39.  Id. at 262, 131 A.3d at 927. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 637, 76 A.3d 1076, 1084 (2013) (hereinaf-
ter “Litz I”).  The decision by the Court of Special Appeals was unreported.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 642, 76 A.3d at 1087.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court erred in 
dismissing those claims because a fact finder had not yet concluded whether the acts of trespass 
and negligence occurred on a continuing basis during the time period allowed by the statute of 
limitations, and therefore the Circuit Court could not conclude whether those claims were barred.  
Id. at 647–50, 76 A.3d at 1090–92.  Further, the court stated that the inverse condemnation claims 
may not be barred because a taking does not occur and the statute of limitations does not begin to 
run “until the taking becomes permanent or stabilized.”  Id. at 654–57, 76 A.3d at 1094–95.  The 
taking may not have become permanent until the property was foreclosed, which occurred within 
the time period permitted by the statute, and so a fact finder could conclude the inverse condemna-
tion claims were not barred by the statute of limitations.  Id. at 656–57, 76 A.3d at 1095. 
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The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which reviewed the remaining claims in an unreported decision.43  
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Circuit Court did not err in 
dismissing the remaining claims against Maryland and the state agencies, 
but did err in dismissing the remaining claims against Goldsboro.44  The 
Court of Special Appeals found that the inverse condemnation claims 
against Maryland and the state agencies were properly dismissed because 
Litz’s claims against them merely constituted “discretionary inaction,” 
which could not support an inverse condemnation claim.45  The Court of 
Special Appeals reached this conclusion because the court classified the ac-
tions of the state and the state agencies as a “failure to regulate.”46  It relied 
on federal case law to conclude that a failure of the government to “avert 
mitigate, or cure” interference with property rights by third parties was not 
sufficient to constitute a taking.47  Following this ruling, Litz filed a second 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Court of Appeals that the court 
granted.48  The court reviewed whether the Court of Special Appeals erred 
in holding that Litz failed to state a cause of action for inverse condemna-
tion against Maryland, MDE, and DHMH.49 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Takings claims can arise against state and local governments under ei-
ther the United States Constitution50 or under a state’s own constitution and 
                                                          
 43.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 262–63, 131 A.3d at 928. 
 44.  Id. at 263, 131 A.3d at 928. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 270–71, 131 A.3d at 933. 
 47.  Id. (first citing Ga. Power Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 554, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1980); and 
then citing Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 48.  Id. at 263, 131 A.3d at 928. 
 49.  Id.  The full list of questions presented to the court were: 
1) Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it held that Petitioner failed to 
state a cause of action for inverse condemnation against the State government Respond-
ents? 
2) Whether an inverse condemnation claim comes within the notice requirements of the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act and the Local Government Tort Claims Act? 
3) Whether the Court of Special Appeals exceeded the scope of this Court’s remand or-
der when it considered an issue disavowed expressly by Respondents, to wit, Petition-
er’s claim for inverse condemnation against the State government Respondents was 
subject to the Maryland Tort Claims Act? 
4) Whether a trespass claim is covered by the notice requirement of the Local Govern-
ment Tort Claims Act? 
Id. at 263–64, 131 A.3d at 928–9. 
 50.  See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits a state government from taking pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation).   
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laws.51  This Part will first summarize the background of the Takings 
Clause in the U.S. Constitution and how federal courts have interpreted that 
clause.52  Next, this Part will look at how Maryland courts have interpreted 
Maryland’s own constitutional clause guaranteeing citizens the right to just 
compensation for property taken by the state government.53  Finally, this 
Part will examine how courts in jurisdictions other than Maryland have de-
cided on the issue presented in Litz.54  Notably, courts have split on the is-
sue of whether inaction can form the sole basis of an inverse condemnation 
claim.55  This Part will compare their holdings and reasoning.56 
A.  Takings Claims Federally and in Maryland 
This Section will examine both the federal law and Maryland state law 
on takings.  The U.S. Constitution provides the basis for federal takings 
claims through the Fifth Amendment57 and for state takings claims through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58  Maryland also has 
its own constitutional provision guaranteeing just compensation for the tak-
ing of property by the government.59  Maryland views U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions on Fourteenth Amendment takings claims as authoritative on 
Maryland’s own constitutional provision prohibiting takings without just 
compensation.60 
1.  Federal Application of the Takings Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that 
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion,” serves as the constitutional basis for takings claims.61  This clause of 
the Fifth Amendment is known as the Takings Clause.  Traditionally, tak-
                                                          
 51.  See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 40 (“The General Assembly shall enact no Law authoriz-
ing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon be-
tween the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such 
compensation.”). 
 52.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 53.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 54.  See infra Part II.B. 
 55.  See infra Part II.B. 
 56.  See infra Part II.B. 
 57.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 58.  Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Comm’n of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 615–16, 
150 A.2d 421, 426–27 (1959) (citing Home Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 
610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956); Leonard v. Earle, 55 Md. 252, 260, 141 A. 714 (1928)). 
 59.  MD. CONST. art. III, § 40. 
 60.  Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 219 Md. at 615–16, 150 A.2d at 426–27 (citing 
Home Utils. Co., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109; Leonard, 55 Md. at 260, 141 A. 714). 
 61.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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ings were thought only to require compensation when the government phys-
ically appropriated the property of a private owner.62  In Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon,63 however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that regulato-
ry actions could serve as the basis for takings claims that require compensa-
tion by the government.64 
A person with a real property interest may bring an inverse condemna-
tion claim when a government entity has allegedly committed a taking of 
that property interest but did not provide just compensation.65  A taking 
may be either partial or complete.66  A partial taking is defined as “one in 
which ‘there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract 
from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation 
of it.’”67  A partial taking does not need to be permanent or stabilized, while 
a complete taking must be permanent or stabilized.68 
To determine whether a particular action constitutes a taking, the 
courts conduct a fact-based inquiry into whether the action “forc[es] some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”69  In Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City,70 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to adopt a “set 
formula” for this determination, but did identify three factors for courts to 
consider in order to determine whether a regulation requires compensating a 
private property owner: (1) the economic impact on the property owner, (2) 
the diminished expectations of the property owner, and (3) the character of 
the government action.71  Further, the Court has held that certain govern-
ment actions constitute per se takings: (1) when the property owner suffers 
a total and complete loss of property value, or (2) when the property owner 
suffers a permanent physical invasion of the property.72  However, the 
Court only finds such per se takings occur in rare circumstances.73  Addi-
                                                          
 62.  See, e.g., Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (requiring “a physical invasion 
of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession” in order for a tak-
ing to require just compensation). 
 63.  260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 64.  Id. at 415. 
 65.  United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); see also Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the 
Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 653, 76 A.3d 1076, 1093 (2013) (citing Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City 
Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 153, 157 (2006)) (“Inverse condemnation is a taking 
without just compensation.”). 
 66.  Litz I, 434 Md. at 654, 76 A.3d at 1094. 
 67.  Id. (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946)). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 70.  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 71.  Id. at 123–24. 
 72.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 73.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., LLC, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (describing the per se tak-
ings categories as “relatively narrow”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
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tionally, the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit have held that takings claims only exist 
when the government itself causes the damage, and not when the damage is 
caused by the “acts of independent third parties.”74 
Although federal courts have not decided on the issue of whether inac-
tion can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims, at least one 
case suggested at the possibility.75  In Columbia Basin Orchard v. United 
States,76 the Court of Claims stated that: 
To constitute a taking, the overflow of or seepage into the spring 
must have been the direct, natural or probable result of an author-
ized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflict-
ed by the action. . . . There must have been an intent on the part 
of the defendant to take plaintiff’s property or an intention to do 
an act the natural consequence of which was to take its property.77 
The court went on to describe a situation in which a government entity 
had the requisite intent: when the natural result of discharging a dredging 
channel would obviously cause damage to private property.78  This suggest-
ed that even though intent is required for an inverse condemnation claim, a 
government inaction could potentially constitute an intentional act if the 
government’s failure to act would have naturally resulted in the taking of 
property.79 
2.  Takings Claims in Maryland 
The state basis for takings claims in Maryland is found in Article III, 
Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, which states that “[t]he General 
Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for 
public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, 
or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to 
such compensation.”80  Additionally, the Fifth Amendment protection 
against takings without just compensation in the U.S. Constitution applies 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
                                                          
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 & n.19 (2002) (discussing the per se situations as “relatively rare” and 
“narrow”). 
 74.  Ga. Power Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 554, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1980); see also Alves v. Unit-
ed States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The government is not an insurer that private 
citizens will act lawfully with respect to property subject to governmental regulation merely be-
cause the government has chosen to regulate . . . .”). 
 75.  Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709, 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
 76.  132 F. Supp. 707 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
 77.  Id. at 709. 
 78.  Id. at 711. 
 79.  Id. at 709, 711. 
 80.  MD. CONST. art. III, § 40. 
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ment.81  The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to takings claims 
are “practically direct authorities” on the Maryland takings provision be-
cause the clauses “have the same meaning and effect in reference to an ex-
action of property.”82 
In College Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,83 the 
Court of Appeals stated that inverse condemnation claims might arise from 
a variety of factual circumstances, including: 
the denial by a governmental agency of access to one’s property, 
regulatory actions that effectively deny an owner the physical or 
economically viable use of the property, conduct that causes a 
physical invasion of the property, hanging a credible and pro-
longed threat of condemnation over the property in a way that 
significantly diminishes its value, or . . . conduct that effectively 
forces an owner to sell.84 
In Maryland inverse condemnation proceedings, the claimant must 
prove (1) that the property was taken and (2) what constitutes “just com-
pensation” under the circumstances.85  In particular, in cases in which the 
inverse condemnation claim is not based on a physical invasion, the damage 
cannot be “consequential”; rather, “[t]he impact on the plaintiff’s property 
ha[s] to be special to it and of a high degree.”86 
At least one inverse condemnation case in Maryland discussed inac-
tion as part of the basis for a takings claim.87  In College Bowl, Inc., the pe-
titioner alleged that the petitioner’s lease was terminated due to the City’s 
threats to the building owner, forcing the owner to terminate leases and re-
develop or face condemnation proceedings.88  In its College Bowl, Inc. 
opinion, the Court of Appeals discussed Amen v. City of Dearborn,89 a case 
adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.90  
                                                          
 81.  Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek Cool & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 157–58, 321 A.2d 
748, 756 (1974) (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 
(1897)). 
 82.  Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Comm’n of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 615–16, 150 
A.2d 421, 426–27 (1959) (citing Home Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 
122 A.2d 109 (1956); Leonard v. Earle, 55 Md. 252, 260, 141 A. 714 (1928)). 
 83.  394 Md. 482, 907 A.2d 153 (2006). 
 84.  Id. at 489, 907 A.2d at 157. 
 85.  Millison v. Wilzack, 77 Md. App. 676, 683, 551 A.2d 899, 902 (1989). 
 86.  Md. Port Admin. v. QC Corp., 310 Md. 379, 391, 529 A.2d 829, 834 (1987). 
 87.  See Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 489–99, 907 A.2d at 157 (citing Amen v. City of Dear-
born, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
 88.  Id. at 394 Md. at 487–88, 907 A.2d at 156. 
 89.  718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 90.  Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 490, A.2d at 157 (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789). 
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The Sixth Circuit found in Amen that government inaction,91 together with 
certain government actions, constituted a taking based on an “aggregate of 
that conduct,” even though none of the actions or inactions individually 
would have formed a sufficient basis for the claim.92  The Court of Appeals 
relied on Amen’s explanation of aggregate conduct to clarify the level of in-
trusion necessary to establish a taking.93  The court found, for example, that 
in College Bowl, Inc. the City did not reach the adequate level of intru-
sion.94  Nevertheless, the court has at least acknowledged prior to Litz that 
inaction could potentially serve as part a pattern of conduct constituting a 
taking.95 
B.  Inaction as the Basis for Inverse Condemnation Claims Beyond 
Maryland 
Several states have decided whether government inaction can serve as 
the basis for a takings claim.96  Jurisdictions are split on whether inaction 
can give rise to a taking.97  Even in those jurisdictions that have held inac-
tion can give rise to a taking, the courts are split on the circumstances under 
which it can do so.98  Courts in some jurisdictions have relied on the state’s 
definition of takings when faced with the issue,99 while courts in other ju-
                                                          
 91.  The government inaction included delaying permits and allowing properties “to remain 
vacant and unprotected.”  Amen, 718 F.2d at 795 (quoting Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. 
Supp. 1267, 1272–73 (E.D. Mich. 1973)). 
 92.  Id. at 795–98. 
 93. Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 490, A.2d at 157–58 (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789). 
 94.  Id. (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789). 
 95.  See id. (citing Amen, 718 F.2d 789) (stating that the “degree of interference” exhibited in 
Amen, which based on its claim on both actions and inactions, was sufficient for an inverse con-
demnation claim). 
 96.  Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Jordan v. St. 
Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Evenson v. City of Saint Paul Bd. of 
Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel. Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 
S.W.3d 365, 367 (Mo. 2008); Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 
771, 773, 777 (N.M. 1992); Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2004); Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016). 
 97.  Compare Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365 (holding inaction can serve as the basis for an in-
verse condemnation claim), with Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562 (holding an affirmative act is re-
quired for inverse condemnation claims). 
 98.  Compare Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365 (imposing no limits on when inaction can serve as 
the basis of an inverse condemnation claim), with Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55 (limiting the 
circumstances for inaction as the basis of an inverse condemnation claim to those in which the 
defendant failed to act despite a known risk). 
 99.  See, e.g., Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562–63 (holding that because South Carolina courts 
have consistently defined inverse condemnation as requiring an affirmative act, inaction alone 
cannot support an inverse condemnation claim). 
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risdictions relied on the elements required for a taking,100 or on whether the 
government had a duty to act.101 
1.  Decisions Based on a State-Specific Definition of Inverse 
Condemnation 
Courts in a couple of jurisdictions have decided whether inaction can 
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims based on the state’s def-
inition of inverse condemnation.102  For example, South Carolina defines 
inverse condemnation as requiring “(1) an affirmative, positive, aggressive 
act on the part of the governmental agency; (2) a taking; (3) the taking is for 
a public use; and (4) the taking has some degree of permanence.”103  Based 
on this definition, which requires an “affirmative, positive, aggressive” act, 
South Carolina held that a failure to act could not serve as the basis for an 
inverse condemnation claim.104  Similarly, Minnesota relied on its definition 
of takings to decide on the issue.105  In Minnesota, however, the standard 
for a taking is broad: “governmental action or inaction that deprives a land-
owner of all reasonable uses of its land.”106  Therefore, in Minnesota, gov-
ernment inaction is expressly a sufficient basis for a takings claim. 
2.  Decisions Based on the Public Use and Intentional Act 
Requirements of an Inverse Condemnation Claim 
Several states have placed emphasis on two elements common to most 
inverse condemnation laws: (1) that the taking must confer a public benefit 
and (2) that government acted intentionally in taking the property.107  
Courts in both Texas and New Mexico determined that inaction could not 
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims because it could not 
                                                          
 100.  See, e.g., Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799 (holding inaction cannot serve as the basis of inverse 
condemnation claims because it cannot meet the necessary elements). 
 101.  See, e.g., Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839 (holding inaction can serve as the basis of inverse 
condemnation claims where the defendant had a duty to act). 
 102.  Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365; Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562–63. 
 103.  Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, 572 S.E.2d 306, 308 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002); Gray v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highways & 
Pub. Transp., 427 S.E.2d 899, 902 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 104.  Id. at 562–63 (citing Berry’s on Main, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 281 S.E.2d 796, 797 
(S.C. 1981)). 
 105.  Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365 (citing Czech v. City of Blaine, 253 N.W.2d 272, 274 
(Minn. 1977)). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See, e.g., Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799–800, 805 (Tex. 
2016) (holding inaction cannot serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim because a 
failure to act cannot be intentional). 
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meet these public use and intent elements.108  In contrast, California deter-
mined that under certain circumstances, an inverse condemnation claim 
could meet these elements.109 
In Texas, the issue first came up in a case in which a landfill’s reten-
tion ponds overflowed and caused trash and other contamination to flood 
onto the plaintiffs’ property, resulting in damage.110  The Court of Appeals 
of Texas stated that the plaintiffs’ claims for inverse condemnation were not 
sufficient because, at most, government inaction could result in negli-
gence.111  The court reasoned that a failure to regulate does not confer a 
benefit on the public and therefore does not meet the public use element of 
a taking.112  In a later Texas Supreme Court case, the court affirmed that in-
action could not serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim and 
clearly stated that an affirmative, intentional act is required for a takings 
claim in Texas.113  The Supreme Court of New Mexico reached a similar 
conclusion in Electro-Jet Tool and Manufacturing Co. v. City of Albuquer-
que,114 finding that damage caused by the failure of a drainage ditch was 
mere negligence.115  For an inverse condemnation claim to succeed, the 
court held that the defendant must have intended or knew that damage 
would likely occur.116 
In contrast to the decisions in Texas and New Mexico, the California 
Court of Appeals held in Arreola v. County of Monterey117 that inaction can 
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims.118  Despite reaching a 
different outcome, the court used reasoning similar to that used by the Tex-
as and New Mexico courts to limit the circumstances under which such a 
claim may succeed.119  The court held that inadequate maintenance of pub-
lic improvement projects can form the basis of an inverse condemnation 
claim because acts of maintenance can be considered extensions of public 
improvement works.120  By limiting the holding to situations involving a 
                                                          
 108.  Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 771, 773, 777 (N.M. 
1992); Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799. 
 109.  Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 53, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 110.  City of El Paso v. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d 181, 183–85 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
 111.  Id. at 187. 
 112.  Id. at 186–87.   
 113.  Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799–800, 805. 
 114.  845 P.2d 770 (N.M. 1992). 
 115.  Id. at 771, 773, 777. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 118.  Id. at 53. 
 119.  See id. (holding that inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim 
when the government failed to act in regard to a public improvement project despite a known 
risk). 
 120.  Id. 
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public improvement project, the court ensured that the public use element 
would be met.121 
Similar to the Texas courts,122 the California court found that “simple 
negligence cannot support” an inverse condemnation claim.123  The court 
held that an inverse condemnation claim had to be supported by a 
“show[ing] that the entity was aware of the risk posed by its public im-
provement and deliberately chose a course of action—or inaction—in the 
face of that known risk.”124  Therefore, California requires intent by the 
government entity.  The court clarified in a later case that a mere failure to 
maintain, or “garden variety inadequate maintenance,” of a public works 
project is therefore only negligence.125  In order to constitute a taking, the 
government entity must have been aware that the failure to maintain a pub-
lic improvement project would pose a risk to property and, despite this risk, 
chose not to maintain the project.126 
3.  Decisions Based on a Determination of Whether the Defendant 
Had a Duty to Act 
Several courts based their decisions about inaction in inverse condem-
nation claims on whether the defendant had a duty to act under the circum-
stances.127  In Ressel v. Scott County,128 the Missouri Court of Appeals 
found that the government defendant could not be held liable under an in-
verse condemnation claim for the government’s failure to repair a road 
washed out by a flood.129  The court determined that the cause of the claim-
ant’s injury was a “force of nature” and found persuasive that other jurisdic-
tions have denied inverse condemnation claims where the damage resulted 
from a force of nature rather than a government act.130  Many of the cases 
                                                          
 121.  Id. 
 122.  City of El Paso v. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding that inaction 
by a government defendant cannot support a claim for inverse condemnation). 
 123.  Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53. 
 124.  Id. at 55. 
 125.  Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366, 372–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See, e.g., Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (limiting 
inaction as a basis for inverse condemnation claims to circumstances where the defendant had an 
affirmative duty to act). 
 128.  927 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 129.  Id. at 519–21. 
 130.  Id. at 521 (citing Wildensten v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 283 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991); Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 773 (N.M. 1992); 
Brown v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 161 S.E.2d 815, 817 (S.C. 1969); Starks v. Albemarle 
Cty., 716 F. Supp. 934, 938 (W.D. Va. 1989)).  Though a California case cited by the court, 
Wildensten v. East Bay Regional Park District, found no inverse condemnation claim existed 
when the government defendant merely failed to stabilize land, resulting in a landslide, later deci-
sions in California have allowed inverse condemnation claims based on inaction in a limited num-
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cited by the court were decided on the grounds that the inverse condemna-
tion claims failed to allege a specific government act that caused the dam-
age; rather, a natural event caused the damage.131  In a subsequent case de-
cided in 2008, the Supreme Court of Missouri discussed Ressel’s 
implication that government inaction cannot serve as the basis for an in-
verse condemnation claim.132  The court held that no inverse condemnation 
claim existed where a city failed to realize that an approved plat could not 
adequately drain storm water, resulting in flood damage to the claimant’s 
property.133  It found that the claimants could not cite any precedent for 
government liability resulting from a failure to act, nor could they point to a 
legal duty breached by the respondent.134  The court refused to adopt “such 
an extreme extension of the law governing inverse condemnation.”135 
In Florida, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District addressed the is-
sue in a case in which the complainants alleged that the respondent county 
failed to reasonably maintain and repair a public road, effectively depriving 
the complainants of the ability to access their property.136  The court con-
cluded that government inaction in the face of an affirmative duty to act can 
support a claim for inverse condemnation.137  The court stated that govern-
ments have a duty to maintain their public roads, and a fact finder would 
need to determine whether the county fulfilled that duty.138 
The Vermont Supreme Court has also held that an inverse condemna-
tion claim can exist where a government entity failed to act when that entity 
had a duty to act.139  In Alger v. Dep’t of Labor and Industry,140 the plain-
tiffs claimed the Vermont Department of Labor and Industry caused an un-
constitutional taking of the plaintiffs’ apartment buildings without just 
compensation due to the Department’s failure to enforce the housing code 
in the buildings.141  The court found that under Vermont law, the Depart-
ment had “a legal duty to enforce the housing code.”142  Even though the 
                                                          
ber of circumstances, as described in Section II.B.2 of this Note.  See Wildensten, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 
15; Ressel, 927 S.W.2d at 521; see also Section II.B.2. 
 131.  Ressel, 927 S.W.2d at 521 (citing Wildensten, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 16; Electro-Jet Tool & 
Mfg. Co., 845 P.2d at 773; Brown, 161 S.E.2d at 817; Starks, 716 F. Supp. at 938). 
 132.  State ex rel. Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365, 372 (Mo. 2008) (citing Ressel, 927 
S.W.2d at 521). 
 133.  Id. at 367. 
 134.  Id. at 372.  
 135.  Id. at 372–73. 
 136.  Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 137.  Id. at 839. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 917 A.2d 508, 521–22 (Vt. 2006). 
 140.  917 A.2d 508 (Vt. 2006). 
 141.  Id. at 511. 
 142.  Id. at 517. 
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Department was given broad discretion to enforce the code, “a wholesale 
failure to enforce the code would violate that duty.”143  The Court further 
found that if the plaintiffs’ allegations were true: 
the Department knew of the relevant code violations, and . . . it 
chose to allow the violations to continue until they became seri-
ous enough to require removal of the tenants or termination of 
utility service.  But for the Department’s failure to act, there 
would have been no nuisance to abate, and plaintiffs’ property 
would not have been taken.144 
The court concluded therefore that the plaintiffs were entitled to just 
compensation.145  Notably, the court recognized that though the “plaintiffs’ 
takings claims are unusual . . . [w]e need only ascertain that plaintiffs’ 
complaint corresponds to general takings principals, and we conclude that it 
does.”146  Additionally, the court did not make any sweeping statements 
about whether and under what circumstances other inactions by a govern-
ment entity could serve as the basis for future takings claims.147 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Litz that a plaintiff can ade-
quately plead an inverse condemnation claim where the plaintiff alleges a 
government entity’s failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act 
resulted in a taking.148  The court further held that Litz had therefore suffi-
ciently stated a claim for inverse condemnation against the Respondents at 
the current stage of the litigation.149  The court found that no Maryland law 
existed that contemplated whether government inaction can result in a tak-
ing.150  The court thus surveyed other jurisdictions to determine how other 
courts have decided cases with similar issues.151  Holding that the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland improperly dismissed the inverse condemna-
tion claims against the state and its agencies, the Court of Appeals remand-
                                                          
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id. at 521–22. 
 145.  Id. at 517, 521–22. 
 146.  Id. at 521. 
 147.  Id. at 521–22. 
 148.  Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 267, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (2016).  The Court 
also held that trespass is covered by the notice requirement of the Local Governmental Tort 
Claims Act (“LGTCA”) and that inverse condemnation claims are not covered by the notice re-
quirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act or the LGTCA.  Id. at 264, 131 A.3d at 928–29.  
These holdings are not discussed substantially in this Note. 
 149.  Id. at 264, 267, 131 A.3d at 929, 931. 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at 268, 131 A.3d at 931. 
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ed the case to the Court of Special Appeals “with instructions to remand the 
case to the Circuit Court for Caroline County for further proceedings.”152 
The jurisdictions discussed by the court in its opinion—California, 
Florida, Minnesota, and South Carolina—were split on whether government 
inaction is sufficient to constitute a taking.153  In particular, Minnesota, 
Florida, and California all held that government inaction could be the basis 
for an inverse condemnation claim.154  In contrast, the South Carolina Court 
of Appeals held that inaction could not form the basis of an inverse con-
demnation claim.155  The court noted the precise reasons for the particular 
holdings in each jurisdiction, and found only the reasoning of the Florida 
and California courts persuasive.156  The court found that South Carolina’s 
case law prescribed a much narrower requirement for an inverse condemna-
tion claim than found in Maryland case law: “an affirmative, positive, ag-
gressive act.”157  Thus, the court did not find South Carolina’s holding per-
suasive because Maryland law establishes no such specific requirement.158 
The court also declined to follow Minnesota’s broad standard for in-
verse condemnation claims.159  Minnesota defines a taking as “government 
action or inaction that deprives a landowner of all reasonable uses of its 
land.”160  Rather, the court found persuasive decisions made by courts in 
Florida and California, which held that government inaction is sufficient as 
a basis for an inverse condemnation claim only when the government has 
an affirmative duty to act or when the government failed to act despite a 
known risk.161  The court found these decisions relevant because the Re-
spondents were warned of the contamination risk through a 1985 study 
conducted by the Caroline County Health Department and subsequent 
warnings over the next two decades.162  Additionally, the court concluded, 
                                                          
 152.  Id. at 280–81, 131 A.3d at 939. 
 153.  Id. at 268–69, 131 A.3d at 931–32 (citing Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002); Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004); Evenson v. City 
of Saint Paul Bd. of Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)). 
 154.  Id. (citing Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839; Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55; Evenson, 467 
N.W.2d at 365). 
 155.  Id. (citing Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 562). 
 156.  Id. at 268–70, 131 A.3d at 931–32 (citing Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839; Arreola, 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 55, 69–72; Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 262; Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365). 
 157.  Id. at 268, 131 A.3d at 931 (quoting Hawkins, 594 S.E.2d at 262). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id., 131 A.3d at 931–32 (“We find more persuasive cases which sanction a plaintiff ad-
vancing an inverse condemnation claim in the face of government inaction where the government 
agency had an affirmative duty to act . . . .”). 
 160.  Id., 131 A.3d at 931 (quoting Evenson, 467 N.W.2d at 365) (emphasis added). 
 161.  Id. at 269, 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839; Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
55). 
 162.  Id. at 269–73, 131 A.3d at 932. 
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the Respondents may have had an affirmative duty to correct the contami-
nation problem or penalize Goldsboro for failing to correct the problem.163 
The court disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals, which charac-
terized the actions of the Respondents as a “failure to regulate.”164  It did 
not find the cases cited by the Court of Special Appeals to support its “fail-
ure to regulate” characterization persuasive because those cases involved 
government failures to “avert, mitigate, or cure” interference with property 
rights by third parties.165  The court argued that in those cases, the claims 
did not constitute a taking “because the regulations [at issue] imposed by 
the Federal Government were not meant to act as an ‘insurer that private 
citizens will act lawfully with respect to property subject to governmental 
regulation.’”166  It reasoned that Litz’s case was “not merely a case of a 
property right being affected adversely by private and third parties solely 
and exclusively,” but, rather, one in which the Respondents failed to act 
when they had “an affirmative duty to abate a known and longstanding pub-
lic health hazard.”167  The Respondents had knowledge of the failing sew-
age and drainage systems, as well as knowledge of the serious contamina-
tion resulting from its failure to repair the systems, including the 
contamination of Lake Bonnie.168  The court concluded the Respondents 
may have had a duty to resolve such a problem in the interest of protecting 
public health.169 
The court further concluded that in addition to a duty to protect public 
health, the State of Maryland, its agencies, and Goldsboro may have had a 
“general or specific statutory” duty to act in the situation under state envi-
ronmental statutes.  Specifically, the Environment Article gives MDE the 
power to enforce the Federal Water Pollution Control Act170 and the Health-
Environmental Article gives DHMH the power to compel sewage opera-
tions as necessary for “public health and comfort.”171  Additionally, the 
court also pointed out that even if no “general or specific statutory” duty to 
act existed, Maryland and Goldsboro may have created an affirmative duty 
to act by entering into the consent order.172  The court therefore held be-
                                                          
 163.  Id., 131 A.3d at 932–33. 
 164.  Id. at 270, 131 A.3d at 933. 
 165.  Id. at 270–71, 131 A.3d at 933 (citing Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1455–56 
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Ga. Power Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 554, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). 
 166.  Id. (quoting Alves, 133 F.3d at 1458). 
 167.  Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 933–34. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 171.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 272–73, 131 A.3d at 934 (quoting State Dep’t of Env’t v. Showell, 316 
Md. 259, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989)). 
 172.  Id. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 2017] LITZ V. MARYLAND DEP’T OF THE ENVIRONMENT 71 
 
cause the state, its agencies, and Goldsboro may have had an affirmative 
duty to act, Litz sufficiently pleaded her claims for inverse condemna-
tion.173  Noting that although Litz may not ultimately succeed in proving her 
claims, the court could not conclude as a matter of law at the motion to 
dismiss stage of the litigation that she would not be able to prove her 
claims.174 
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Battaglia and McDonald, 
Judge Watts dissented from the majority’s holding that government inaction 
can form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.175  Judge Watts ar-
gued that “[t]he definition of ‘inverse condemnation,’ examples of claims 
for inverse condemnation, and judicial restraint” lead to the result that an 
affirmative act is required to make a claim that a taking occurred.176  The 
dissenters would have held that an affirmative act is required.177  Judge 
Watts noted that when the case was first considered by the court in 2013 on 
appeal under different grounds, the court stated that an inverse condemna-
tion claim requires that the property was “taken in fact,” which Judge Watts 
interpreted as requiring an affirmative action.178  In all of the examples of 
inverse condemnation claims decided or even contemplated under Maryland 
case law, all such claims involved an affirmative act, and not inaction.179 
Judge Watts further argued that the majority’s decision effectively 
“creat[es] a private right of action anytime a plaintiff’s property decreases 
in value as a result of a governmental entity’s noncompliance with a stat-
ute.”180  Examining the language of the relevant portion of the Environment 
Article and noting that the majority did not examine the legislative history 
of the article to determine the intent of the legislature, Judge Watts found 
no indication that the General Assembly intended for the statute to create 
such a private right of action.181  Judge Watts concluded that the majority 
                                                          
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 281–82, 131 A.3d at 939–40 (Watts, J., dissenting). 
 176.  Id. at 282–83, 131 A.3d at 940. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 283, 131 A.3d at 940 (quoting Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 653, 76 
A.3d 1076, 1093 (2013)). 
 179.  Id. at 283–85, 131 A.3d at 940–41 (citing Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxa-
tion, 442 Md. 544, 566, 30 A.3d 962, 974 (2011); Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of 
Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 153, 157 (2006); Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Rds. 
Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 504–06, 880 A.2d 307, 309–10 (2005); City 
of Annapolis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484, 507, 745 A.2d 1000, 1012 (2000); MacLeod v. City of 
Takoma Park, 257 Md. 477, 481, 478, 263 A.2d 581, 582, 584 (1970)). 
 180.  Id. at 285, 131 A.3d at 941. 
 181.  Id. at 285–86, 131 A.3d at 941–42 (citing MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-253 (LexisNexis 
2013); Walton v. Mariner Health of Md., Inc., 391 Md. 643, 669, 894 A.2d 584, 599 (2006)). 
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“greatly expand[ed] the definition of inverse condemnation, the conse-
quences of which are yet to be seen.”182 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held for the first time in Litz that 
inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim when the 
government fails to act despite a duty to do so.183  Other jurisdictions have 
held similarly, and the Court of Appeals justifiably found persuasive the 
reasoning of those courts.184  The decision in Litz is also consistent with the 
policy objectives behind takings clauses on both the federal and state lev-
el.185  Additionally, the majority’s reasoning in Litz will avoid the negative 
consequences the dissent argues will occur as a result of the holding,186 be-
cause the holding only applies in circumstances where the government had 
an affirmative duty to act, which the courts can limit in the future.187 
A.  The Court of Appeals Properly Found Convincing the Reasoning of 
the California and Florida Courts 
The cases on which the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied were 
those in which the courts found inaction could serve as the basis for an in-
verse condemnation claim when the government entity had an affirmative 
duty to act or failed to act despite a known risk.188  The Maryland court was 
justified in finding these cases persuasive not only because of the factual 
similarities between Litz and those cases, but also because of the reasoning 
used to reach the holdings in those cases.189 
In contrast, the majority in Litz found the reasoning in Evenson v. City 
of Saint Paul Board of Appeals190 and Hawkins v. City of Greenville,191 the 
cases from Minnesota and South Carolina, unconvincing.192  The majority 
                                                          
 182.  Id. at 286, 131 A.3d at 942. 
 183.  Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931 (majority opinion). 
 184.  Id., 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55, 6972 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 185.  See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the holding in Litz relates to prior takings cases fed-
erally and in Maryland). 
 186.  See generally Litz II, 446 Md. at 282–86, 131 A.3d at 940–42 (Watts, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the majority’s holding unreasonably expands the definition of inverse condemnation).  
 187.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the majority’s holding avoids the negative conse-
quences asserted by the dissent). 
 188.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 269, 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 
839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 50 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002)). 
 189.  See supra Part II.B.1–2 (summarizing the decisions of the California and Florida courts). 
 190.  467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
 191.  594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 192.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 268, 131 A.3d at 931. 
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found the doctrine put forth by Minnesota was overly broad—it stated that 
any inaction which deprived an owner of “all reasonable uses” was a tak-
ing.193  In contrast, the majority found the South Carolina definition of tak-
ings was more specific than the Maryland definition.194  Therefore, the court 
was justified in choosing not to rely on the reasoning of these courts, which 
based their decisions on state-specific definitions. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found most persuasive two cases 
from Florida and California195: Arreola v County of Monterey and Jordan v. 
Saint Johns County.196  Both of these cases involved the government’s fail-
ure to adequately maintain public improvement projects—a road in Jor-
dan197 and a levee in Arreola.198  Similarly, Litz involved Goldsboro’s fail-
ure to develop a public sewage system and the State of Maryland’s failure 
to enforce the installation of such a system.199  The Litz court thus relied on 
cases with similar facts.  Additionally, although not discussed in Litz, the 
Vermont case Alger is also factually similar to Litz because in Alger, as in 
Litz, the claimant alleged a taking resulting from the government’s failure 
to enforce a state law.200 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not consider the decisions of 
several other states which have touched on the issue of whether inaction can 
support an inverse condemnation claim, such as decisions in New Mexico 
and Texas.201  Even though the New Mexico and Texas courts found that 
under the specific circumstances of those cases the inverse condemnation 
claims could not succeed,202 the decisions can be reconciled with courts that 
ruled inaction could serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims. 
                                                          
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 269, 131 A.3d at 932 (citing Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Jordan v. Saint Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)). 
 196.  63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 197.  Id. at 836. 
 198.  Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. 
 199.  See generally Litz II, 446 Md. at 265, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (outlining the factual history of 
the case and the allegations put forth in the complaint). 
 200.  Compare id. at 272–73; 131 A.3d at 934 (“Ms. Litz contends that she alleged sufficiently 
a cause of action for inverse condemnation by alleging that the failure of Respondents to address 
the pollution and sewage problems led directly to the substantial devaluing of her property and its 
ultimate loss.”), with Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Industry, 917 A.2d 508, 513 (Vt. 2006) (“Plain-
tiffs alleged that the Department’s actions were consistent with its general failure to enforce the 
housing code . . . . The amended complaint also contained the previous complaints’ claims that the 
Department took plaintiffs’ property without due process or just compensation . . . .”). 
 201.  See generally Litz II at 268–69, 131 A.3d 931–32 (examining only the decisions made by 
the California, Florida, Minnesota, and South Carolina courts); supra Part II.B.2 (describing the 
decisions of the New Mexico and Texas courts). 
 202.  See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the holdings and reasoning of the New Mexico and 
Texas courts). 
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The Supreme Court of Texas held that inaction could never rise above 
the level of negligence.203  The court, however, also stated “the requisite in-
tent is present when a governmental entity knows that a specific act is caus-
ing identifiable harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain to re-
sult.”204  And, in City of Dallas v. Jennings,205 the same court stated: “There 
may well be times when a governmental entity is aware that its action will 
necessarily cause physical damage to certain private property, and yet de-
termines that the benefit to the public outweighs the harm caused to that 
property.”206 
Therefore, Texas appears to have left open the possibility that the af-
firmative act of deciding not act could potentially serve as the basis for an 
inverse condemnation claim.  The New Mexico decision similarly suggests 
that the defective maintenance of a public use project with the defendant’s 
“knowledge of a substantial probability of damage” or a deliberately calcu-
lated risk could support an inverse condemnation claim.207  The Court of 
Claims also suggested that a failure to act might still be intentional if the 
known result of that failure would be damage to private property.208  These 
implications in the Texas, New Mexico, and Court of Claims decisions are 
remarkably similar to the holding of the California Court of Appeals in Ar-
reola—that inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation 
claim only when the government entity “deliberately chose a course of ac-
tion—or inaction.”209  This holding could be interpreted as still requiring an 
affirmative act—the affirmative act of deciding not to act. 
In scope and in language, Maryland’s holding is most similar to Flori-
da’s holding—both require an affirmative duty to act in order for a govern-
ment’s failure to act to constitute a taking.210  Given the factual circum-
stances in Litz, however, the decision is also consistent with the reasoning 
of the California Court of Appeals in Arreola.  Specifically, the government 
defendants in Litz had knowledge that the failure to act would result in the 
continued pollution of Lake Bonnie and yet chose not to enforce the con-
                                                          
 203.  Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016). 
 204.  Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex. 2004). 
 205.  142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004)). 
 206.  Id. at 314. 
 207.  Electro-Jet Tool & Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 773, 777–79 (N.M. 
1992). 
 208.  Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709, 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
 209.  Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 210.  Compare Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 267, 131 A.3d 931 (2016) (“[A]n in-
verse condemnation claim is pleaded adequately where a plaintiff alleges a taking caused by a 
governmental entity’s or entities’ failure to act, in the face of an affirmative duty to act.”), with 
Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[G]overnmental inac-
tion—in the face of an affirmative duty to act—can support a claim for inverse condemnation.”). 
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struction of a sewage system.211  In both Litz and Arreola, the government 
defendants knew that their failure to act would result in damage to private 
property and nevertheless chose not to act.212  Therefore, the Court of Ap-
peals was justified in relying on the Florida and California cases, based both 
on the similarity of the factual circumstances, and on the reasoning used by 
the courts. 
B.  The Holding of Litz Supports the Goals of Takings Jurisprudence 
The court’s decision to expand the doctrine of inverse condemnation to 
include government inaction comports with the purposes of the takings 
clause as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and Maryland courts.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the goal of the federal takings clause is to 
prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”213  The Court of Appeals cites this language frequently in its own 
takings cases,214 including in Litz.215  This view of the takings clause, as 
well as the factual and legal circumstances of Litz, may have influenced the 
court’s decision.216  While Litz’s claims might better be expressed as tort 
claims, such as nuisance and trespass—Litz in fact alleged claims of nui-
sance, negligence, and trespass—her tort claims against the state and the 
state agencies were all barred either by statutes of limitation, the notice re-
quirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, or sovereign immunity.217 
As a local newspaper pointed out in regard to the court’s decision: 
“The decision is significant not just because the state has resources that 
small towns like Goldsboro do not, but also because the state has issued 
hundreds of similar orders to fix pollution, but doesn’t enforce them all.”218  
                                                          
 211.  Litz II, 446 Md. 272, 131 A.3d 934 (2016). 
 212.  Id.; Arreola, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 55, 57. 
 213.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  
 214.  See, e.g., Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 
153, 157 (2006) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)); Reichs 
Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Rds. Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 511, 
880 A.2d 307, 313 (2005) (using similar language to explain that “the economic impact of a pub-
lic project” should not be borne by “a group of individual property owners” (citing Armstrong, 
364 U.S. at 49)). 
 215.  446 Md. at 266, 131 A.3d at 930 (quoting Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 289, 907 A.2d at 
157). 
 216.  Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931. 
 217.  See generally id. at 261–64, 131 A.3d at 927–29 (citing Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 434 
Md. 623, 642, 76 A.3d 1076, 1087 (2013) (describing the procedural history of the case). 
 218.  Rona Kobell, Maryland Court Revives Water Pollution Lawsuit Against State, BAY J. 
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.bayjournal.com/article/maryland_court_revives_water_pollution_law 
suit_against_state. 
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Indeed, the population of Goldsboro was 264 people as of 2010219 and, as 
the article noted, the town’s residents could not afford even ten percent of 
the total cost of the very public sewer system at issue in the case.220  There-
fore, without the opportunity to recover from the state through her inverse 
condemnation claims, Litz would be left only with her claims against the 
town, lessening the possibility that she would recover any actual monetary 
compensation if her claims are eventually successful.  Allowing Litz to re-
cover on inverse condemnation theory fits into the policy justifications un-
derlying the takings theory to compensate individuals whose property is in-
equitably taken by the government. 
The court took the view that the government respondents in Litz may 
have been responsible for the property damage at issue, and if so, would 
owe the petitioner just compensation.221  In particular, the court pointed out 
that Litz did not allege that her property was “affected adversely by private 
third parties solely and exclusively.”222  Indeed, federal courts have express-
ly denied that the government is responsible for compensating takings of 
regulated property committed by third parties.223  Rather, the petitioner’s 
property was “‘condemned’ by the failure of the State and Town . . . to 
abate a known and longstanding public health hazard.”224  The court rea-
soned that the town and the state may have had affirmative duties to act to 
prevent or limit such a hazard generally, or specifically under the Consent 
Order entered into by the town and MDE.225  The court indicated that such a 
duty does not exist when the government merely fails to enforce the con-
duct of third parties with respect to property rights regulated by the gov-
ernment.226  Specifically, the court pointed to the statutory powers of the 
state agencies to make and enforce rules and Consent Orders in the interest 
of protecting public health and preventing pollution.227  The court held the 
                                                          
 219.  Goldsboro, MD. STATE ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/37mun/golds 
boro/html/g.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2017).  Caroline County had a population of 33,066 as of 
2010.  Caroline County, Maryland, MD. STATE ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdman 
ual/36loc/caro/html/caro.html (last updated Aug. 26, 2016). 
 220.  Kobell, supra note 218. 
 221.  446 Md. at 273; 131 A.3d at 934. 
 222.  Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 223.  Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (1998); Georgia Power Co. v. United States, 
633 F.2d 554, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing Minot v. United States, 546 F.2d 378 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).  See 
also Litz II, 446 Md. at 271, 131 A.3d at 933 (“Neither [Alves nor Georgia Power Co.] resulted in 
a ‘taking’ because the regulations imposed by the Federal Government were not meant to act as an 
‘insurer that private citizens will act lawfully with respect to property subject to governmental 
regulation.’” (quoting Alves, 133 F.3d at 1458)). 
 224.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 271–72, 131 A.3d at 933. 
 227.  Id. at 272–73, 131 A.3d at 934 (quoting State Dep’t of Env’t v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 
264, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 393, 396 (1989)). 
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lower court must determine whether such an affirmative duty existed.228  
According to the court, a taking can only occur when the government entity 
had an affirmative duty to act and failed to do so.229  The decision therefore 
leaves open the possibility that Litz may recover on her claims and that fu-
ture complainants may obtain recovery from damages resulting from a gov-
ernment entity’s failure to fulfill an affirmative duty. 
In his article Passive Takings, Professor Christopher Serkin argues that 
inaction should be a sufficient basis for takings claims because such takings 
claims could ensure government actions are benefiting the public.230  He ar-
gues that such claims are justified because property owners can inequitably 
suffer costs from government inaction just as they suffer costs from gov-
ernment actions.231  Claims like the one at issue in Litz seem to fit within 
these policy objectives of takings claims.  In Litz, the failure to develop a 
public sewer system disproportionately impacted Litz because the lake on 
her property was contaminated to the point where she could no longer oper-
ate her business.232  The cost of building a sewer system, however, should 
have been borne by the public through taxpayer funds collected and used by 
the government.233  The court embraced the view that the government may 
have effectively condemned Litz’s property by forcing her to bear the costs 
of the government’s failure to build a public sewer system.234  Allowing her 
claim to continue past the motion to dismiss stage of the litigation therefore 
comports with the fairness-based theory of takings,235 because it requires 
the government to bear the cost of failing to build the sewage system if the 
government had an affirmative duty to do so.236 
C.  The Majority Opinion Avoids the Negative Consequences Suggested 
by the Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Watts argued that the deci-
sion by the majority in Litz contradicts Maryland’s takings jurisprudence.237  
Judge Watts offered several reasons why Maryland should only recognize 
inverse condemnation claims that plead a taking due to a government ac-
                                                          
 228.  Id. at 273; 131 A.3d at 934. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 362 (2014). 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  446 Md. at 264, 131 A.3d at 929. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 235.  Serkin, supra note 230, at 364. 
 236.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 237.  Id. at 283–85, 131 A.3d at 940 (Watts, J., dissenting). 
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tion, and not due to government action.238  However, the majority’s reason-
ing was actually consistent with takings jurisprudence, and Maryland can 
avoid the negative consequences asserted by the dissenting opinion.  Fur-
ther, the holding in Litz can be limited in the future, and therefore will not 
vastly increase takings litigation as the Maryland courts can clarify the ex-
act scope of the holding through application.239 
1.  Nothing in Maryland Takings Jurisprudence Prevented the 
Majority from Holding Inaction Can Constitute a Taking 
Judge Watts argued that the very term “take” requires the government 
to take “some kind of affirmative action, as opposed to an omission.”240  
Further, Judge Watts argued that Maryland’s description of what actions 
constitute the basis for inverse condemnation claims in prior cases did not 
contemplate inaction, only affirmative acts.241  The majority’s holding, 
however, has a sufficient basis in federal and state takings jurisprudence.  
While the U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized an inaction as the basis 
for an inverse condemnation claim, the Court also has never rejected the 
theory.  Further, several states other than Maryland have held that a gov-
ernment’s failure to act, at least in certain circumstances, can constitute a 
basis for inverse condemnation.242  Although several other courts agreed 
with the dissent’s view of the definition of a taking, the holdings in some of 
those jurisdictions are not inconsistent with Litz.243 
While the Maryland Court of Appeals has not previously recognized 
that government inaction can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation, 
the court has also never addressed the issue before.244  The court previously 
outlined examples of inverse condemnation, but it did not state that inverse 
condemnation claims were limited to such examples.245  Therefore, nothing 
in Maryland’s takings jurisprudence prevented the court from deciding that 
inaction could serve as the basis for inverse condemnation claims.  In par-
ticular, the majority may have been concerned that Litz’s case and any simi-
                                                          
 238.  Id. at 940–41. 
 239.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 240.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 283, 131 A.3d at 940 (Watts, J., dissenting). 
 241.  Id. at 284, 131 A.3d at 941. 
 242.  See supra Part II.B (discussing the holdings of Minnesota, Florida, California, and Ver-
mont that inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim in some circumstanc-
es). 
 243.  See supra Part IV.A (comparing the reasoning of courts that have previously ruled on the 
issue with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning). 
 244.  See Litz II, 446 Md. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931 (finding no Maryland law is controlling on 
the issue of whether government inaction can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation 
claim). 
 245.  Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 489, 907 A.2d 153, 157 
(2006). 
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lar cases that may arise could only be resolved “in all fairness and jus-
tice”246 by allowing inaction to serve as a basis for inverse condemnation.  
While the court did not directly articulate such an intention, instead stating 
merely that it found the California and Florida cases persuasive,247 the in-
tention seems implied from Litz’s sympathetic situation,248 the quote used 
to open the opinion,249 and the court’s emphasis that the town and the state 
failed “to abate a known and longstanding public health hazard.”250 
2.  The Decision Can Be Limited in the Future 
In Litz, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was clear that the holding 
that government inaction can serve as a basis for inverse condemnation 
claims was limited to circumstances where the government had an affirma-
tive duty to act.251  The court also made clear that no affirmative duty to act 
might actually exist in Litz, noting that at the time the decision was handed 
down, the parties had neither briefed nor argued the issue.252  Beyond these 
limitations, the court did not provide much direction as to the potential 
scope of its holding.  Such a vague holding, at first glance, may not appear 
beneficial to litigants desiring predictability, especially government entities 
that may now face new claims based on their inaction.253  Although the dis-
sent argued that the holding “greatly expands the definition of inverse con-
demnation,”254 the court will have an opportunity to narrow the application 
of the holding to specific factual or legal circumstances as cases arise.  Fur-
ther, the holding is already limited in that claimant must demonstrate that 
the government entity had a legal duty to act, not just the power to act.255 
                                                          
 246.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 266, 131 A.3d at 930 (quoting Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 489, 907 
A.3d at 157). 
 247.  Id. at 269–70, 131 A.3d at 932. 
 248.  See generally id. at 257–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (describing the factual background of 
the case).  Additional details regarding Litz’s history with the property can be found in a local 
newspaper article about the case.  Kobell, supra note 218.  Notably, Litz planned to use the 
campground business to fund her retirement and planned to pass the property on to her children, 
but now she has lost the property to foreclosure and currently lives with her son and his family.  
Id. 
 249.  “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, ‘I’m from the government 
and I’m here to help.’”  Litz II, 446 Md. at 257, 131 A.3d at 924 (quoting President Ronald 
Reagan, Statement at a Chicago Press Conference (August 12, 1986)). 
 250.  Id. at 272, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 251.  Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931. 
 252.  Id. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 253.  For example, a representative of the environmental group Chesapeake Legal Alliance 
stated the decision will allow environmental groups to ensure the state enforces consent orders 
requiring the prevention, reduction, or clean-up of pollution.  Kobell, supra note 218. 
 254.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 286, 131 A.3d at 942 (Watts, J., dissenting).  
 255.  Id. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931 (majority opinion). 
 80 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 76:54 
 
Takings cases are already decided on a fact-specific, case-by-case ba-
sis.256  The court’s holding in Litz merely imposes another inquiry in cases 
based on inaction: whether the defendant had an affirmative duty to do 
act.257  The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes only two limited instances 
where government action constitutes a per se taking: (1) when the govern-
ment entity physically invades or compels the physical invasion of the 
property, and (2) when the action results in a total loss of the property’s 
value.258  Further, the Court has so narrowly interpreted per se takings that 
such takings are rarely found, especially under the total loss of value stand-
ard.259  In all other circumstances, takings claims are analyzed by the court 
using the factors outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. New York City.260  The Court has outright stated 
that it: 
has been unable to determine any “set formula” for determining 
when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused 
by public action be compensated by the government . . . whether 
a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the govern-
ment’s failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it de-
pends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that] 
case.”261 
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, it is entirely possible that Litz 
may not succeed in her claim for inverse condemnation, because the state 
and the town may not have had affirmative duties to act and Litz may not be 
able to prove that damage to her property rises to the level of a taking for 
which compensation is required.262  The dissent argued that the statute the 
majority relied on to find the respondents might have had an affirmative du-
ty to act263 did not create a private right of action.264  Therefore, the dissent 
argued, the majority’s opinion improperly created such a private right.265  
                                                          
 256.  Id., 131 A.3d at 930. 
 257.  Id., 131 A.3d at 931. 
 258.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 259.  John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 
173 (2005). 
 260.  438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002); Echeverria, supra note 259, at 173. 
 261.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted) (first citing Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); and then quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining 
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)). 
 262.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934 (majority opinion); see also Millison v. Wilzack, 
77 Md. App. 676, 683, 551 A.2d 899, 902 (1989) (stating that inverse condemnation complainants 
must demonstrate that their property was taken and how much compensation is owed). 
 263.  MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-253 (LexisNexis 2014).  
 264.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 285, 131 A.3d at 941–42 (Watts, J., dissenting). 
 265.  Id. 
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However, the majority opinion merely stated that the statute, or the Consent 
Order, may have created an affirmative duty.266  The court was careful to 
specify that the parties neither briefed nor argued the question of whether 
such affirmative duties existed, and therefore the court could properly re-
solve the issue on remand.267  Indeed, Litz did not bring a claim under the 
Environmental Code, but rather her claim arose under the takings provision 
of the Maryland Constitution.268 
We can use the facts in Litz to analyze the extent to which the court’s 
holding may be limited in the future based on what could occur on remand 
in the case.  On remand, Litz will need to prove that the Respondents had an 
affirmative duty to act.269  Comparing the circumstances in Litz to cases in 
which courts held the government entity did have an affirmative duty to act, 
the circumstances are relatively similar, and on remand the court could find 
those cases persuasive.270  Similar to the government actors in Arreola, Jor-
dan, and Alger, the Respondents in Litz were aware that their failure to act 
would and did result in extensive damage to private property.271  Even if 
Litz can establish that an affirmative duty to act existed, she may not be 
able to recover under her inverse condemnation claim.  Her property does 
not fit within the per se takings category of total loss of property value.272  
The fact that her property was sold for $364,000 in the foreclosure action 
rules out the possibility of total loss of value.273 
Litz may argue that her claim fits within another category of per se 
takings: that the government compelled a physical invasion of her proper-
ty.274  However, to take advantage of the per se takings rule, Litz would 
                                                          
 266.  Id. at 272, 131 A.3d 934 (majority opinion) (stating that although the issue of whether an 
affirmative duty existed remained to be decided, “it is not frivolous to hypothesize that state, 
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 269.  Id. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934. 
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 272.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 273.  Litz II, 466 Md. at 261, 131 A.3d at 927. 
 274.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
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need to demonstrate that the physical invasion was permanent and not tem-
porary, as temporary physical invasions are analyzed under the Penn Cen-
tral Transportation factors and do not constitute per se takings.275  Addi-
tionally, Maryland has not yet addressed the issue of whether sewage 
contamination constitutes a physical invasion of the land in the context of 
inverse condemnation claims.276  To demonstrate a permanent taking may 
require a factual finding that the contamination is permanent in nature, and 
potentially that the government will permanently fail to install a public 
sewer system.  Litz likely will not be able to prove the latter because the 
county has begun construction on a public sewer system.277  Additionally, 
per se takings generally are rarely found and the standards are applied nar-
rowly.278 
If Litz cannot prove her claims fall under a per se takings rule, the 
Penn Central factors apply.279  Application of the Penn Central factors is 
somewhat unpredictable, as the courts consider the totality of the circum-
stances and the Supreme Court has failed to provide much detailed guid-
ance.280  Notably, the economic impact under the Penn Central analysis 
must generally still be severe, and even a severe economic loss alone will 
not constitute a taking.281  Therefore to recover, Litz will likely need to 
demonstrate a large percentage of her property value was lost as a result of 
the contamination.  She must additionally demonstrate that the character of 
the government’s inaction would support a takings claim or that she had in-
vestment backed expectations that were destroyed by the government’s in-
action.  Even if Litz argues that she lost not only the value of her property, 
but the ability to profitably run her business, she may not succeed because 
“profitability has traditionally not been recognized as a protected property 
interest under the takings clause.”282  One circumstance in Litz’s favor, 
however, is the fact that damage to her property affects her property unique-
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tamination, including odor, is a physical invasion under an inverse condemnation claim.  Sundell 
v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315, 1319 (N.H. 1979). 
 277.  Kobell, supra note 218. 
 278.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 173 (2005). 
 279.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002). 
 280.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 171–72. 
 281.  Id. at 178. 
 282.  Id. at 182. 
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ly and to “a high degree,” as required in inverse condemnation cases where 
no physical invasion is involved.283 
The other two Penn Central factors, Litz’s investment-backed expecta-
tions and the character of the government’s action, could also ultimately fall 
within Litz’s favor.284  Typically, the investment-backed expectations factor 
is analyzed in the context of whether the relevant regulation was enacted 
before the claimant purchased the property, the extent of the claimant’s 
knowledge of the regulatory action restricting the property if it existed prior 
to purchase, and the foreseeability of the regulation if the regulation was not 
in place prior to purchase.285  Additionally, the courts consider the reason 
the property was purchased.286  Litz’s case in particular is complicated by 
the fact that she inherited the property at issue, and the Court has struggled 
with the weight that inheritance should hold on the investment-backed ex-
pectations factor because the inheritor did not actually invest in the proper-
ty.287  Based on the facts disclosed by the Court of Appeals, Litz’s parents 
originally used the property as a farm and the lake was created for irrigation 
purposes.288  Litz apparently planned to depend on the campground business 
her parents had developed for income289; however, even if the property was 
used as originally intended, the sewage contamination of Lake Bonnie like-
ly would have prevented adequate irrigation. 
Finally, the character of the government action in Litz is unusual be-
cause the claimant alleges her property was taken due to the Respondents’ 
inaction rather than a specific act.290  One component of this factor is 
whether there was an actual physical invasion of the property.291  Litz could 
argue that her property was physically invaded by contaminated water292 
and even a temporary physical invasion tends to favor a finding that a tak-
ing occurred.293  Additionally, the courts look at whether the act harms the 
claimants as individuals disproportionately, or places a burden properly on 
the public as a whole.294  In Litz’s case, the failure to develop an apparently 
necessary sewage system appears to have caused some harm to the 
                                                          
 283.  Md. Port Admin v. QC Corp., 310 Md. 379, 391, 529 A.2d 829, 834 (1987). 
 284.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 285.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 183–84. 
 286.  Id. at 185. 
 287.  Id. at 185–86. 
 288.  Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 258, 131 A.3d 923, 925 (2016). 
 289.  Id. at 258–59, 131 A.3d at 925. 
 290.  Id. at 265, 131 A.3d at 929. 
 291.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 186–87, 203. 
 292.  See Litz II, 446 Md. at 259–60, 131 A.3d at 925–26 (describing the sewage contamina-
tion of Lake Bonnie). 
 293.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 203. 
 294.  Id. at 204. 
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Goldsboro population as a whole.295  Litz has a strong argument though that 
the failure disproportionately affected her property alone because the 
town’s drainage systems fed into the streams, which terminated at Lake 
Bonnie, dumping the contaminated water in the lake.296  Additionally, the 
courts look at the advantage of the regulation both to the public as a whole 
and to the claimants.297  Here, the failure to develop a sewage system was 
beneficial to neither the residents of Goldsboro nor to Litz—to the contrary, 
this failure continued a longstanding harm to public health.298  Therefore, in 
the event that the court holds the Respondents had an affirmative duty to 
enforce the development of a sewage system, Litz has a reasonable chance 
of obtaining at least some compensation based on the Penn Central analy-
sis.  The standards for takings claims are typically high,299 however, and as 
the Court of Appeals pointed out, there is also a reasonable probability that 
Litz will not meet these standards.300 
The Maryland courts can refine the scope of the holding in Litz 
through application.  California, for example, also broadly held that inaction 
can form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim.301  Following that de-
cision, the court further refined the scope of that holding through applica-
tion in subsequent cases.302  For example, in Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 
800,303 a California court began defining the scope, stating that, “garden va-
riety inadequate maintenance, as distinguished from a faulty plan involving 
the design, construction and maintenance of a levee, is not an adequate ba-
sis for an inverse condemnation claim.”304  California also held that inaction 
can form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim only in the context of 
public improvement projects: “to state a cause of action for inverse con-
demnation, the plaintiff must allege the defendant substantially participated 
in the planning, approval, construction, or operation of a public project or 
                                                          
 295.  See Litz II, 446 Md. at 259–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (describing the history and extent of 
Goldsboro’s stormwater drainage and sewage contamination problems). 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 204. 
 298.  See Litz II, 446 Md. at 259–61, 131 A.3d at 925–27 (describing the history and extent of 
Goldsboro’s stormwater drainage and sewage contamination problems). 
 299.  Echeverria, supra note 259, at 178. 
 300.  See Litz II, 446 Md. at 273, 131 A.3d at 934. 
 301.  Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
 302.  See, e.g., Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366, 373–74 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (refusing to extend the inverse condemnation doctrine to situations where the govern-
ment entity merely failed to adequately maintain a public improvement project). 
 303.  48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 304.  Id. at 373–74. 
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improvement which proximately caused injury to plaintiff’s property.”305  
Maryland can similarly refine the scope of the holding in Litz in the future. 
The dissent in Litz is not the first to criticize government inaction as 
the basis for inverse condemnation claims.  For example, some scholars 
have criticized Florida’s holding in Jordan: 
The court . . . concluded, without citing authority, “that govern-
mental inaction—in the face of an affirmative duty to act—can 
support a claim for inverse condemnation.” . . .  Should this ex-
tremely troublesome notion gain judicial traction, the implica-
tions would be disastrous for government officials whose budgets 
would be stretched to the limits (and beyond) by a judicial man-
date to absorb the repair costs for damages caused by storms, 
floods, drought, unprecedented snowfalls, and other manifesta-
tions of climate change.306 
These critics were concerned with the increased financial liability that 
governments could face for failures to act due to the decision in Jordan.307  
Because of the holding, private citizens could potentially recover under an 
inverse condemnation claim for a government’s failure to make repairs fol-
lowing damages caused by natural disasters or storms.308  Another article 
noted that if courts found that governments have a duty to maintain public 
improvement projects such that no damage would result to private property, 
local governments would be forced to make the choice between spending 
potentially unreasonable amounts of money or facing legal liability.309  The 
article noted that the impact of Florida’s cases which held that inaction can 
serve as the basis for inverse condemnation will depend on how the courts 
decide in future cases on whether the government had an affirmative duty to 
act.310  Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland left open the question 
of whether the Respondents in Litz actually had an affirmative duty to 
act.311  How the courts decide on the issue of whether the Respondents had 
                                                          
 305.  Wildensten v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist, 283 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
Ullery v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 248 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Souza v. Silver Dev. Co., 
210 Cal. Rptr 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Holtz v. Superior Court, 475 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1970) (en 
banc); Albers v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965) (en banc)). 
 306.  DANIEL R. MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW § 12.15 (6th ed. 
2015). 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Thomas Ruppert & Carly Grimm, Drowning in Place: Local Government Costs and Lia-
bilities for Flooding Due to Sea-Level Rise, 87 FLA. BAR J., at 29, 31–32 (2013). 
 310.  Id.  No subsequent Florida cases have cited to Jordan or another Florida case in which 
certain government actions and inactions resulted in a finding that the claimant was entitled to just 
compensation.  Charlotte County v. Rotonda Project, 91 So. 3d 249, 249–50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 311.  Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 273, 131 A.3d 923, 934 (2016). 
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an affirmative duty to act will determine whether Litz’s claim individually 
can succeed, and can further define whether such affirmative duties exist in 
other situations. 
The dissenting opinion in Litz, as well as critics of decisions by courts 
in other jurisdictions which made similar holdings, argue that holding inac-
tion can serve as the basis for inverse condemnation unreasonably expands 
the scope of the claim.312  The holding in Litz, however, is limited to situa-
tions in which the government had an affirmative duty to act.313  Courts in 
other jurisdictions have similarly limited their holdings, and through subse-
quent application, further refined the scope of their holdings.314  Therefore, 
through application over time, the Maryland courts can also limit the hold-
ing in Litz.  The facts of the Litz case in fact demonstrate that even given the 
decision by the Court of Appeals, Litz still faces a substantial burden on 
remand.315  Litz must prove not only that the defendants had an affirmative 
duty to act,316 but that her damages fulfill the elements of an inverse con-
demnation claim.  Therefore, the holding in Litz can avoid potential nega-
tive consequences, such as vastly increasing the liability of state and local 
governments. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The holding in Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the Environment is only one 
of several state court decisions on the issue of whether inaction by a gov-
ernment entity can serve as the basis for an inverse condemnation claim.317  
While various jurisdictions have held differently, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals found most persuasive the reasoning that government entities 
should be held liable in inverse condemnation for inaction if the govern-
ment entity had an affirmative duty to act.318  As applied to Litz’s case and 
generally, this holding does not contradict any federal or state takings juris-
prudence and comports with the policy objectives behind inverse condem-
nation claims.319  Further, by limiting the cause of action to circumstances 
in which an affirmative duty exists, the Court of Appeals provided a mech-
                                                          
 312.  See generally id. at 281–86, 131 A.3d at 939–42 (Watts, J., dissenting); MANDELKER & 
WOLF, supra note 306, at § 12.51; Ruppert & Grimm, supra note 309. 
 313.  Litz II, 446 Md. at 267, 131 A.3d at 931. 
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anism by which inverse condemnation claims can be further limited by 
what duties are determined to be affirmative.320 
 
 
                                                          
 320.  See supra Part IV.C (discussing how courts in other jurisdictions have limited their hold-
ings that inaction can serve as the basis of an inverse condemnation claim and how Maryland may 
limit its holding in the future). 
